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PASSING THE BATON: TRACK SUPERSTAR MARION
JONES' DUTY AND LIABILITY TO HER OLYMPIC
RELAY TEAMMATES
I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 2007, millions of avid sports fanatics, track and field
aficionados, and Marion Jones enthusiasts felt the pain of their hearts
breaking as the gold medal track star admitted to taking performance
enhancing drugs.' The Olympian confessed to ingesting the steroid
tetrahydrogestrinone (THG or "the clear") before the 2000 Olympic
Games in Sydney, Australia. 2 After seven years of denial, Marion
Jones pled guilty to lying to federal investigators about using the ster-
oids and was subsequently punished by the International Association
of Athletics Federations (IAAF) and the International Olympic Com-
mittee (IOC).3
The question then remains: what will happen to Jones's Olympic
relay team members (Torri Edwards, Chryste Gaines, Passion Rich-
ardson, Jearl Miles-Clark, Monique Hennagan, LaTasha Colander-
Richardson, Andrea Anderson and Nanceen Perry) and their Olympic
medals, standings, and diplomas?4 The IAAF was the first organiza-
tion to take a position when it annulled Jones's relay teams' IAAF
and Olympic results and required the relay team to return all awards
and medals earned in IAAF competitions.5 Subsequently, the IOC
disqualified Jones's teammates from the 4x100 meter relay and 4x400
meter relay of the 2000 Olympic games and asked those athletes in-
volved to return the medals and diplomas awarded to them.6
1. Jones Pleads Guilty in Doping Case, 19 No. 10 Andrews Ent. Indus. Litig. Rep. 9 (West
2007)
2. Id.
3. Press Release, International Association of Athletics Federation, IAAF Press Release on
Marion Jones (November 23, 2007) (on file with author) available at http://iaaf.org/news/newsID
=42531; Highlights of Last IOC Executive Board Meeting of the Year, International Olympics
Committee (December 12, 2007) (on file with author) available at http://www.olympic.org/uk/
includes/common/article-print-uk.asp?id=2428.
4. Amy Shipley, Jones's Running Mates Told to Return Medals, Wash. Post, April 11, 2008, at
E02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/10/AR2008041
003272.
5. Press Release, supra note 3; Highlights of Last IOC Executive Board Meeting of the Year,
supra note 3.
6. Press Release, International Olympic Committee, IOC Announces More Stringent Mea-
sures in its Fight Against Doping (April 10, 2008) (on file with author) available at http://www.
olympic.org/uk/includes/common/article-print uk.asp?id=2536.
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Before LaTasha Collander-Richardson's gold medal and records
were annulled, she stated, "[b]ecause of the decision [Jones] chose to
make, [Jones] took that decision and choice away from the rest of us.
Now and forever, to some extent, whether they take the medal or do
not take the medal, it's going to be tainted. The rest of us, our charac-
ters will be questioned."7 The chief executive of the USOC com-
mented on the effects of doping and said, "[w]hen an athlete makes
the choice to cheat, others end up paying the price, including team-
mates, competitors and fans."8 The seemingly obvious injustice of this
result raises the question of whether Jones's teammates can legally
recover for the loss of their Olympic medals, records, and integrity.
Jones's eight teammates are left with no records and no medals be-
cause Marion Jones violated the Olympic doping regulations. The
natural question that follows is what redress, if any, is available to
Jones's teammates who complied with the doping rules and competed
in the events fairly and safely? Do Jones's relay mates have a cause of
action against Jones based on the fact that they lost their Olympic
medals, records and integrity as a result of her doping violations?
The Marion Jones steroid controversy continues, but her teammates
must not be forgotten or brushed aside amidst this controversy.
Jones's relay mates committed no violations yet are suffering from the
repercussions of Jones's poor choices, over which they had no control.
This article will discuss tort liability under the theories of negligence
and recklessness, analyze such liability theories as they apply to
Marion Jones and her eight teammates, and present a possible
solution.
II. BACKGROUND
The IAAF Council reviewed Marion Jones's admission to taking
performance enhancing drugs and confirmed the following conse-
quences and sanctions: 1) a two-year period of ineligibility beginning
October 8, 2007; 2) disqualification of Marion Jones from all competi-
tions on or after September 1, 2000; 3) annulment of all her individual
competitive results on or after September 1, 2000; 4) annulment of the
results of relay teams in which she competed in IAAF competitions on
or after September 1, 2000; 5) return of all awards and medals ob-
tained in relation to abovementioned competitions; and 6) return of
money awarded. 9 The IAAF also recommended that the IOC execu-
7. Miles-Clark Says She Might Have To Pay For Jones' Doping, ESPN, Oct. 12, 2007, http:l/
sports.espn.go/com/espn/print?id=3060896&type==story.
8. Shipley, supra note 4.
9. Press Release, supra note 3.
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tive board disqualify Jones and her teammates in the women's 4x100m
and 4x400m relays from the 2000 Sydney Olympics and insist on the
return of medals and diplomas.' 0
The IOC Executive Board disqualified Jones from the 100m, 200m,
4x400m relay, 4x100m relay and long jump. In addition, at the IOC's
request, Jones returned the medals won in those events." In April
2008, the IOC Executive Board disqualified Jones's first place, gold
medal, relay mates in the 4x400m relay (Jearl Miles-Clark, LaTasha
Collander-Richardson, Monique Hennagan and Andrea Anderson)
and third place, bronze medal, relay mates in the 4x100m relay
(Chryste Gaines, Torri Edwards, Nanceen Perry and Passion
Richardson). 12
Traditionally, the IOC utilizes the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS) in order to arbitrate international sports disputes.' 3 CAS de-
cides two types of disputes: commercial and disciplinary. 14 Generally,
doping violations fall under the disciplinary disputes category while
civil liability matters fall under the commercial category.' 5 CAS arbi-
trators decide both disciplinary and commercial disputes; however,
disciplinary cases are often resolved by sports authorities and only go
to CAS upon an appeal. 16 While the IOC provides for arbitration, an
alternative avenue for Jones's relay teammates would be to pursue the
matter in the United States judicial system under tort principles.
III. LIABILITY IN TORT
A. Theories of recovery: Negligence or Recklessness?
The courts and legislatures have struggled to find the appropriate
standard of care for athletes who inflict physical injuries on another
athlete during competitive sporting events. When injury to a player is
involved, the decision makers are torn between what constitutes part
of the game and what is the scope of the duty placed upon sporting
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Press Release, supra note 6; Shipley, Supra note 4.
13. A. Jerome Dees, Bring Back the Crowd? How Governing Bodies for Sports Should Pro-
vide Victims of Athlete Doping a Better Remedy, 9 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 179, 183 (2008) (stating
that CAS was created by the IOC to decide international sporting disputes.)
14. Id. at 186; see also History of the CAS, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-
239-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/.
15. Dees, supra note 13 at 186; see also History of the CAS, http://www.tas-cas.orglen/
infogenerales.asp4-3-239-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/.
16. Dees, supra note 13 at 186; see also History of the CAS, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/
infogenerales.asp4-3-239-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/.
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participants.' 7  A negligence standard was most often applied by
courts in the past, but the majority of courts has recently shifted to-
wards the adoption of a reckless disregard standard.' 8 The analysis of
the athlete's duty to another athlete has been confined to physical in-
juries that result from contact or rule violations. However, the courts
could use either a negligence standard or recklessness standard when
determining what standard of care an athlete owes to her teammates
in order to avoid an injury such as the loss of Olympic medals and
records.
1. Negligence
Traditionally, state courts applied a negligence standard to deter-
mine liability in sports related tort cases. 19 Under the Restatement
approach, negligence is defined as:
an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as in-
volving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of
another, or a failure to do an act which is necessary for the protection
or assistance of another and which the actor is under a duty to do.2 0
To succeed in a negligence cause of action, a plaintiff must show a
duty, breach of that duty, injury or damages, and causation. 2 1 Each of
these requirements are evaluated and decided on a case-by-case basis.
A duty in negligence cases is an obligation to conform to a particu-
lar standard of conduct towards another person.22 A duty can be im-
posed through common law, statute, contract or as a matter of public
policy. 23
After a duty has been established, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant breached the duty owed to plaintiff. When determining if a
breach has occurred, the defendant must have failed to conform to the
17. Mel Narol, Sports Participation with Limited Litigation: The Emerging Reckless Disregard
Standard, 1 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 29 (1991).
18. Michael F. Taxin, The Changing Evolution of Sports: Why Performance Enhancing Drug
Use Should be Considered in Determining Tort Liability of Professional Athletes, 14 Fordham
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 817, 818 (2004). The traditional standard is a showing of mere
negligence, but courts have started to adopt a reckless standard by showing "conduct is such that
it is either deliberate, willful or with a reckless disregard for the safety of the other play so as to
cause injury to that player."; See generally Nabozny v. Barnhill. 334 N.E.2d 258 (111. App. Ct.
1975); Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10TH Cir. 1979).
19. Taxin, supra note 18 at 819.
20. Restatement (Second) Torts, § 284 (1965).
21. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 30 (5TH ED. 1984).
22. KEETON ET AL., supra note 21 at 356.
23. Restatement (Second) Torts, § 285 (1965).
[Vol, 5:39
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standard required of a reasonable person in a similar circumstance or
situation.2 4
Once a breach has occurred, the plaintiff must show that he has
suffered an injury or damages. The plaintiff must prove that he has
suffered harm "legally compensable by damages." 25 Plaintiff must
have suffered economic, personal or physical loss or an invasion of a
protected interest such as loss of wages. 26 Finally, there must be "[a]
reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the re-
sulting injury." 27
In Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that negligence was the appropriate standard to
govern cases that involve injuries during recreational team contact
sports.28 In Lestina, the defendant slide tackled the plaintiff during a
recreational soccer match, which caused the plaintiff to seriously in-
jure his knee and leg.2 9 The plaintiff sued the defendant under a the-
ory of negligence asserting that his conduct was negligent and
reckless. 30 The court stated that negligence consists of failing "to use
that degree of care which would be exercised by a reasonable person
under the circumstances." 3 ' To determine whether a player's conduct
was negligent, the court evaluated six material factors: 1) the sport
involved, 2) the rules and regulations, 3) the generally accepted cus-
toms and practices, 4) the risks inherent in the game and those outside
the game, 5) the presence of protective equipment or uniforms, and 6)
the facts and circumstances of the case including player ages, skills,
and knowledge of the rules and customs. 3 2 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court found that the negligence standard can consider all of the cir-
24. Keeton, supra note 21 at 164.
25. Restatement (Second) Torts, § 328A (1965).
26. Richard. J. Hunter, Jr., An "Insider's" Guide to the Legal Liability of Sports Contest Offi-
cials, 15 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 369, 379 (2005).
27. Keeton, supra note 21 at 165.
28. Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 33 (WI 1993) (Lestina has since
been superseded by Wisconsin statute W.S.A. § 895.525, which imposes a reckless disregard
standard for sport injury cases in tort).
29. Id. at 29.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 32.
32. Id. at 33; Hana R. Miura, Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co.: Widening the Court
as a Playing Field for Negligent Participants in Recreational Team Contact Sports, 1994 Wis. L.
Rev. 1005, 1010 (1994) (stating that the 6 factors in Lestina were derived from Missouri case
Niemczyk v. Burleson that also applied a negligence standard. However, the Supreme Court of
Missouri reconsidered the appropriateness of negligence and held that recklessness is more ap-
propriate but that courts will continue to apply the 6 factors. The retention of the 6 factors
signified that recklessness does not differ substantially from negligence.)
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cumstances of the case and is flexible to permit vigorous
competition.3
In Connecticut, the Superior Court considered whether a softball
player could recover under a theory of negligence for injuries result-
ing from an opposing player's conduct during a game. 34 The Connect-
icut court relied on Lestina, and reiterated that in a non contact sport,
recovery for injuries is not necessarily limited to reckless or inten-
tional conduct.3 5 The court stated that a person playing sports can be
required to act as a reasonable person of ordinary prudence under the
circumstances.36
Other courts have also adopted the negligence standard in sports
cases, including professional hockey, snow skiing, golf, and softball
tort cases.37 Applying a negligence standard in sport injury cases has
become the minority position; however, certain public policy reasons
support negligence as the correct standard. First, sporting events
adopt certain standards and rules for a reason-they protect partici-
pants from injury and promote fairness.38 Second, athletes should be
held to the same reasonable standard as society at large. 39 And fi-
nally, a negligence standard does not infringe on vigorous participa-
tion in sports.40 Most jurisdictions have not found these reasons
persuasive, though, and the recklessness standard has emerged as the
dominate standard for determining liability in sports tort cases that
result in physical harm.
2. Recklessness
In increasing numbers, state and federal courts across the country
have reconsidered the negligence standard and shifted the standard to
recklessness, which is a higher standard of care. A majority of courts
have recognized that in the sporting context, a heightened standard of
care is required because contact is more prevalent and often required
33. Lestina at 33.
34. Cahill v. Carella, 648 A.2d 169, 172-73 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See e.g., Babych v. McRae, 567 A.2d 1269 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (applying a negligence
standard to injury in a professional hockey game); LaVine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d
730 (10th Cir. 1977) (applying negligence standard to njury in collision between skiers); Duke's
GMC Inc. v. Erksine, 447 N.E.2d 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (applying negligence standard to golf
injury).
38. Erica K. Rosenthal, Inside the Lines: Basing Negligence Liability in Sports for Safety-
Based Rule Violations on the Level of Play, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2631, 2659 (2004).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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in many sports such as football, hockey, and soccer. 4 1 Therefore,
courts have shifted the burden upward to adopt a reckless disregard
standard. 4 2
The black letter law qualifies an actor's conduct as reckless disre-
gard of another's safety "if he does an act or intentionally fails to do
an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason
to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not
only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which
is necessary to make his conduct negligent." 4 3 For instance, reckless-
ness can result from the actor knowing or having reason to know of
the facts that create a high degree of risk of physical harm to another
and he deliberately continues to act or fails to act in conscious disre-
gard to that risk. 44 Alternately, the actor may have the knowledge or
reason to know of the facts but does not realize or appreciate the risk
involved while a reasonable man would understand. 4 5 In either situa-
tion, an objective standard is applied to the actor to determine what a
reasonable man in a similar situation knows or should know. 4 6
For example, in Nabozny v. Barnhill, the Illinois Appellate Court
found that a player is liable for injury in tort when his conduct is delib-
erate, willful or with reckless disregard for the safety of another player
and causes injury.47 In Nabozny, the plaintiff was a goal keeper who
had possession of the ball in the penalty box when the defendant ran
forward and kicked the left side of the plaintiff's head, which is a vio-
lation of the soccer rules. 4 8 The defendant's contact caused perma-
nent damage to the plaintiff's skull and brain.4 9
The Illinois court articulated policy reasons for using a reckless dis-
regard standard and emphasized that the law should not place "unrea-
sonable burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports by
our youth."5 0 Further, the court did not want to chill active participa-
tion in sports through the fear of litigation based on ordinary negli-
41. Oswald v. Township High Sch. Dist. No. 214, 406 N.E.2d 157,159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
42. Mel Narol, Sports Participation with Limited Litigation: The Emerging Reckless Disregard
Standard, 1 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 29, 30 (1991).
43. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965).
44. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, cmt. (1965).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1975).
48. Id. at 260.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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gence.5 1 The Nabozny court ultimately applied a recklessness
standard to find that a player has a legal duty of care to every other
player to refrain from conduct proscribed by safety rules, i.e. making
illegal contact with a goal tender during a soccer game.52 Ultimately,
a player is liable for injury in a tort action when his conduct is deliber-
ate, willful or with a reckless disregard for the safety of the other play-
ers so as to cause injury to that player, and it is a question of fact that
should be decided by a jury.53
In another case, Gauvin v. Clark, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
held that participants in athletic events owe a duty to refrain from
reckless misconduct towards other participants and that liability may
result from injuries caused as a result of the breach of that duty.54 In
Gauvin, the defendant had "butt-ended" the plaintiff with his hockey
stick, violating a safety rule and causing injury to the plaintiff.55 The
court reasoned that imposing liability under recklessness will decrease
the need for players to seek retaliation during the game or future
games.56 Further, heightening the standard to recklessness decreases
the threat of litigation based on a lower, ordinary negligence standard
that might chill vigorous participation in sporting events. 5 7 Other ju-
risdictions have held athletes to this recklessness standard, for exam-
ple, it has been applied anywhere from simple recreational games to
professional football games including kick the can, softball games,
golf, and professional football.58
Ultimately, courts across the United States use either a negligence
standard or reckless disregard standard in order to determine an ath-
lete's liability for injury to another athlete. Consequently, it is plausi-
ble to consider extending these standards to not only physical injury
but also to the injury sustained by athletes who lose records, medals
and money due to the negligent and reckless acts of other athletes
while on the field of play.
51. Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Wis. 1993) (discussing the Na-
bozny court's reasons for adopting a recklessness standard).
52. Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 261.
53. Id.
54. Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 97 (Mass. 1989).
55. Id. at 95.
56. Id. at 97.
57. Id.
58. See Hackbart v. Cincinati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979) (applying reckless-
ness standard to injuries in professional football); Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio
1990) (applying reckless disregard standard to golf); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio
1990) (applying recklessness standard to kick then can); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.
1982) (applying a recklessness standard to athletes in a softball game); Connell v. Payne, 814
S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App. 1991).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF JONES' LIABILITY TO HER TEAMMATES
A. Jones's Recklessness or Negligence towards Relay Mates
1. Recklessness-Why a Reckless disregard standard should not
apply in Marion Jones's case
The majority of jurisdictions hold that an athlete in a contact sport
owes a duty to fellow athletes to refrain from reckless conduct, while
ordinary negligence is not enough to create liability.59 Specifically, an
athlete acts with reckless disregard of safety when she knows or has
reason to know of the facts that create a high degree of risk of physi-
cal harm to another and she deliberately continues to act or fails to act
in conscious disregard to that risk. 60 This reckless disregard of safety
standard was meant for contact rule violations and is too high of a
standard to be applied in doping rule violation cases.
Courts apply the reckless disregard standard over the ordinary neg-
ligence standard for three reasons: 1) to foster vigorous and free par-
ticipation; 2) to avoid the chilling effects of the threat of litigation; and
3) to reduce the athlete's need to seek retaliation in future games.6'
The courts recognize that some injuries are an inevitable result of con-
tact sports; therefore, athletes should only be held liable for reckless
conduct. 62
For instance, in Gauvin v. Clark, the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts held that a player was not liable for injuries caused by his violat-
ing a safety rule where he did not act with reckless disregard of
safety.63 The defendant physically "butt ended" the plaintiff with a
hockey stick, violating safety rules and proximately caused the plain-
tiff's spleen to rupture. 64 The court followed the majority of jurisdic-
tions and adopted the reckless disregard for safety standard because
hockey is a contact sport and a negligence standard would chill vigor-
ous and active participation in sporting events for fear or threat of
litigation.65 Further, this standard "diminishes the need for players to
seek retaliation during the game or future games." 66
59. See Jaworski v. Keirnan, 696 A.2d 332 (Conn. 1997); Nabozny, supra note 47; Marchetti,
supra note 58; Ross, supra note 58; Gauvin, supra note 54 (finding that defendant must have
reckless disregard for other players, mere negligence is not enough for liability).
60. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, cmt. (1965).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d at 97.
64. Id. at 95.
65. Id. at 97.
66. Id. at 45.
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In the cases involving physical injury, these three policy concerns
are valid; however, in Marion Jones's case they are inappropriate.
Contact that violates league safety rules can be accidental and inad-
vertent. Therefore, holding an athlete to a reckless disregard for safety
standard instead of an ordinary negligence standard is valid. How-
ever, an athlete that takes illegal steroids and violates specific doping
rules should not be held to this higher standard because it would not
promote free and vigorous participation in sports, avoid the chilling
effects of litigation, or reduce retaliation on the playing field.
First off, the IOC, USOC and IAAF have adopted strict anti-doping
protocols in order to promote vigorous and active participation in a
safe and fair manner. Anti-doping rules are meant to protect the indi-
vidual athletes from the health risks associated with steroids and to
create a natural and level playing field in competition. Holding
Marion Jones to a reckless disregard of safety standard would pro-
mote unsafe, unfair and unhealthy active and vigorous participation in
track and field. Subjecting Jones or any Olympic athlete to this higher
standard would only encourage steroid use as long as the athlete does
not recklessly disregard another's safety. Jones did not recklessly dis-
regard her teammates' physical safety, but she did recklessly disregard
her own safety and health and promoted vigorous participation fueled
by illegal steroid use.
Second, imposing the higher standard of reckless disregard would
chill litigation. Do athletic organizations want to turn a blind eye to
athlete doping violations by creating a higher standard of proof? This
is certainly a situation that athletic organizations would want to avoid.
The purpose behind these regulations is to protect every athlete's
health and safety, and by heightening the standard to recklessness,
Jones's teammates might be less likely to bring a law suit in fear of not
meeting the recklessness standard.
Finally, applying the recklessness standard in doping violation cases
would not stop players from seeking retaliation for injuries that result.
On the contrary, it may have the inverse effect and promote the use of
performance enhancing drugs so that the athletes can compete on a
"level" playing field. Athletes may then retaliate towards other ath-
letes by taking the prohibited steroids as long as they do not disregard
another athlete's safety in the process.
Holding Marion Jones to a standard of reckless disregard for an-.
other's safety is a harder burden to meet and ignores the policy behind
this heightened standard. Jones acted with reckless disregard for her
own personal safety and she also acted with reckless disregard to her
teammates because she did not appreciate the risk of them losing their
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medals as a result of her actions. A reckless disregard standard is in-
appropriate here because it would allow Jones to blindly or unknow-
ingly take illegal supplements and shift liability. Jones could claim
that she did not knowingly take the drugs, she did not know of the
facts or the risks towards her teammates, she did not disregard the risk
towards herself or teammates, and she did not recklessly disregard an-
yone's safety.
Ultimately, Marion Jones's teammates should not be required to
show that Jones acted with a reckless disregard for their safety; in-
stead, the courts should look to a standard of ordinary negligence.
Marion Jones ingested prohibited steroids, violated doping rules, and
disqualified her Olympic relay teammates records and medals. Taking
prohibited steroids in itself is reckless enough conduct.
a. Why a Negligence Standard Should Apply in Marion Jones's
Case
The courts that apply a negligence standard for sport related physi-
cal injuries have articulated three distinct reasons for applying an or-
dinary negligence standard, and this reasoning applies to Marion
Jones's case. First, rules in the sporting arena are adopted for a rea-
son- they protect participants from injury and promote fairness and
safety.67 Second, athletes should be held to the same reasonable stan-
dard as society at large.68 And finally, a negligence standard does not
infringe on the vigorous participation in sports.69 These three reasons
also support a negligence standard for doping rule violations that
cause injury, and Marion Jones should therefore be held to a negli-
gence standard and be required to act as a reasonable person in a
similar circumstance.
Marion Jones is guilty of taking the performance enhancing drug
THG, or "The Clear", in direct violation of Olympic doping regula-
tions.70 As a result of Jones's actions, the United State's Women's
4x100m and 4x400m relay teams were disqualified from the Sydney
Olympics, their records were annulled and their medals were taken
away.71
67. Erica K. Rosenthal, supra note 38.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Committee Recommendations, International Olympic Committee, IOC Disciplinary
Commission Recommendations Regarding Ms. Marion Jones (December 12, 2007) (on file with
author); Committee Decision, International Olympic Committee, IOC Executive Board Deci-
sion Regarding Ms. Marion Jones (December 12, 2007) (on file with author).
71. Committee Recommendations, supra note 70; Committee Decision, supra note 70.
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The use of performance enhancing drugs is illegal for a reason; they
are dangerous to an athlete's health and safety. Consequently, institu-
tions such as the IOC, USOC and IAAF have adopted strict anti-dop-
ing rules, policies and procedures in order to protect the athletes from
injury to themselves and other athletes and to promote fairness and
safety across the competition. 72 A negligence standard properly ap-
plies in doping rule violation cases because these policies and rules are
adopted as the standard of care that an athlete owes to herself and
fellow athletes.73 A violation of these rules can be evidence of negli-
gence.74 Marion Jones, an Olympic athlete, was well aware of the
anti-doping rules and chose to break them. She admitted to taking the
performance enhancing drug, thereby risking her own health and
safety and forced her eight Olympic relay teammates to compete at an
unfair and unsafe advantage.
Furthermore, Marion Jones should be held to the same reasonable
standard of care as society. She should not be afforded special treat-
ment because she is an Olympian, rather, she is a role model for ath-
letes across the world and should be held to the specific standard of
care as set forth in the doping rules.
Finally, holding Jones to a negligence standard does not infringe on
active and vigorous participation in sports. Anti-doping rules pro-
mote active and vigorous participation in sports but in a safe, fair and
natural manner.
b. Why Marion Jones was negligent
Under the common law, to determine whether Marion Jones was
negligent in violating doping rules and consequently harming her eight
Olympic relay teammates, those teammates must show: duty, breach
of that duty, injury or damages, and causation.75 Specifically in sports
tort cases, the court may consider the six factors enunciated in Lestina
v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company: 1) the sport involved, 2) the
rules and regulations, 3) the generally accepted customs and practices,
4) the risks inherent in the game and those outside the game, 5) the
presence of protective equipment or uniforms, and 6) the facts and
72. Press Release, International Olympic Committee, IOC Announces More Stringent Mea-
sures in its Fight Against Doping (April 10, 2008) (on file with author) available at http://www.
olympic.orgluk/includes/common/article-print-uk.asp?id=2536.
73. Duke's GMC Inc. v. Erksine, 447 N.E.2d 1118, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
74. Id.
75. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 30 (5TH ED. 1984).
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circumstances of the case including player ages, skills, and knowledge
of the rules and customs. 7 6
First, Jones's Olympic relay mates must show that Jones owed her
relay teammates a duty to conform to a particular standard of con-
duct.77 Both case law and public policy supports holding athletes to a
duty of care toward other athletes while on the playing field. For ex-
ample, in Picou v. Hartford Insurance Company, the court stated that
athletes have a duty to play with sportsmanlike conduct, according to
the rules of the game and with regard for other participants.78 In Na-
bozny, an Illinois court found a legal duty to exist between athletes
because all teams involved are trained and coached by competent in-
dividuals, a recognized set of rules governs the conduct of the game; a
safety rule is designed to protect players from injury; and a player is to
refrain from conduct proscribed by a safety rule. 7 9
Furthermore, the court in in Yancey v. Superior Court found that
generally, defendants have no legal duty to eliminate risks inherent in
the sport itself, but they have a duty to use due care not to increase
the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport.80
The Yancey court introduced a limited duty of care test to include 1) is
careless conduct an inherent risk of the sport and 2) will the imposi-
tion of a legal duty or liability alter the nature or chill participation in
the sport?81 Additionally, the court might consider the athlete's rela-
tionship to the sport and the nature of the sport involved.8 2
According to this standard, Marion Jones also owes a duty to her
running mates. Jones is an Olympic athlete that has competed in hun-
dreds of races. Sportsmanship and regard for one's teammates are the
foundation for any successful team. Jones and her running mates
were trained at the Olympic level by some of the best running, dieting,
and lifting coaches in the world. Jones and her relay teammates were
required to follow the anti-doping policies promulgated by the IOC
and IAAF and were aware of the anti-doping regulations. Specifically,
all athletes are aware of the purpose behind the anti-doping rules -
the safety of the athletes and to promote fair competition. Jones
broke this safety rule by taking performance enhancing steroids,
76. Lestina, 501 N.W.2d at 33.
77. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 30 at 356 (5TH ED.
1984).
78. Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787,789 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
79. Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 261.
80. Yancey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 4th 558, 33 Cal. Rptr.2d 777 (5TH Dist. 1994).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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which was designed to promote safe and fair play for both Jones and
her teammates.
Second, Jones's teammates must show that Jones breached this duty
by failing to conform to a standard of care. Factors the court may con-
sider when evaluating Jones's negligent conduct could include the na-
ture of the act itself, the manner in which an act is performed or the
nature of the injury.83
Based on these factors, Marion Jones owed a duty of care to her
relay mates to act as a reasonable athlete would act in an Olympic
competition. Clearly, a reasonable athlete would comply with the
anti-doping regulations not only for the safety of one's own health but
to promote fairness to the competition and her teammates. In this
case, Jones failed to act as a reasonable athlete. She admitted to tak-
ing "the Clear," which is a prohibited steroid and is guilty of violating
doping regulations. And as a result of her poor life choices, Jones
disqualified her entire team's 2000 Olympic records and medals. Fur-
ther, she caused her teammates to suffer personal humiliation and
pain through the entire ordeal.
Third, Jones's teammates must show injury or damages- Plaintiff
must have suffered economic, personal or physical loss or an invasion
of a protected interest such as loss of wages.84 This prong is satisfied
because Jones's relay mates suffered economic, personal and physical
loss. After Jones admitted to violating anti-doping policies by taking
prohibited substances, the IOC and IAAF disqualified Jones's relay
team's records and medals in the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games.85
Jones's teammates suffered economic loss as a result of having their
medals taken away. They no longer are part of Olympic placing teams
and have lost any endorsements as a result. Moreover, they suffered
personal and physical loss because their integrity will always be ques-
tioned and they no longer have records or medals to show their ac-
complishments. And these losses are attributed to Jones's negligence
in failing to follow anti-doping policies and procedures.
Fourth, Jones's teammates must show that the breach of the duty
caused the injury. Jones's breach in duty was the cause in fact of her
teammates' injuries. Because of Jones's negligent conduct in failing to
comply with doping regulations, her teammates lost medals, records
and integrity. 86 Jones's actions resulted in economic, personal and
83. Richard. J. Hunter, Jr., An "Insider's" Guide to the Legal Liability of Sports Contest Offi-
cials, 15 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 369, 378 (2005).
84. Id. at 379.
85. Press Release, supra note 3; Committee Decision, supra note 70.
86. Shipley, supra note 4.
[Vol. 5:39
PASSING THE BATON
physical harm to her teammates. In other words: but for Jones's con-
duct, her teammates would still be respected Olympians with records
and medals to prove it. Jones's eight teammates have no Olympic
medals, records or integrity as a direct result of Jones taking illegal
performance enhancing drugs, which resulted in disqualification.
In the sporting context, a court may weigh the six factors articulated
in Lestina in order to determine if the athlete was negligent. 7 First,
the court may look at the specific game involved."8 In this case the
specific games are the 4x100 meter relay and 4x400 meter relays of the
2000 Olympic games. Second, the rules and regulations of the sport
involved are explicitly outlined by the IOC, USOC and IAAF.8 9
Third, the accepted customs and practices found at the Olympic level
of track and field do not including doping. Fourth, the court will con-
sider the risks inherent in the sport and those outside the sport. 90 In
this case, losing medals and records is not an inherent risk of track and
field, but it takes additional affirmative steps that are outside the sport
context. Fifth, the courts will consider the protective equipment, but
in this case they may look to the protective rules and regulations
found in the anti-doping procedures. 91 The sixth factor, considers the
facts and circumstances of the particular case including the athlete's
ages, physical attributes, skill, and knowledge of the rules and
customs. 92
In the end, Marion Jones should be required to act as a reasonable
athlete in a similar circumstance-the negligence standard. The over
arching purpose of the doping rules is safety and fairness. It is against
public policy to require Jones's eight relay teammates to prove a
heightened standard because a recklessness standard would only sup-
port steroid use.
V. SOLUTION
A. Professional malpractice-a negligence standard
The ideal solution would be to institute a professional malpractice
standard for the sporting arena. The Black's Law Dictionary defines
malpractice as: "an instance of negligence or incompetence on the
part of a professional."9 3 And it also refers to malpractice as profes-
87. Lestina 501 N.W.2d at 33.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
2008] 53
54 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 5:39
sional negligence. Similar to a doctor or an attorney, the courts
should look to professional negligence or malpractice at the Olympic
level of sporting competition. 9 4 In Jones's case, the courts should hold
her to a professional standard to act with the degree of skill and care
that an Olympic athlete would use in similar circumstances.
A negligence standard is more appropriate in this case than a reck-
lessness standard for multiple policy reasons. First, the courts should
consider the general purpose for participating in the sport; second, the
experience and age of the athletes; third, the impact of role models;
and fourth, the importance of maintaining competition.95 Marion
Jones's purpose in competing in the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney,
Australia was not merely for recreation or educational reasons.
Marion Jones was an elite athlete that competed in track and field for
honor, valor, medals, records, endorsements, et cetera. Marion Jones
and her eight relay teammates competed in track in field no only for
the love of the competition but it was their career. Consequently,
these professional athletes must all be subject to a professional negli-
gence standard for malpractice.
Second, Marion Jones was a seasoned and experienced athlete. The
2000 Olympics was not the first time Jones had competed on the world
level. 9 6 Jones was a respected athlete in the track and field world and
did not lack experience or age. Therefore, the professional negligence
or malpractice standard is appropriate.
Third, Marion Jones not only represented herself in each track and
field competition, she also represented women, minorities, and the
United States of America. People across the world look up to Marion
Jones as an athlete and role model. She was the woman athlete of
1998.97 She has disappointed many by taking performance enhancing
drugs and violating doping rules. Olympic events are the most pres-
tigious events in the sporting world and Olympians must be held to a
standard of professional negligence.
Finally, there is a policy issue of maintaining competition. By hold-
ing Olympic athletes to a professional negligence standard, they will
be liable for their actions and competition will thrive. If we held
94. Id. The Black's Law Dictionary defines legal malpractice as a lawyer's failure to render
professional services with the skill, prudence, and diligence that an ordinary and reasonable
lawyer would use under similar circumstances. It defines medical malpractice as a doctor's fail-
ure to exercise the degree of care and skill that a physician or surgeon of the same medical
specialty would use under similar circumstances.
95. Rosenthal, supra note 38 at 2663.
96. IAAF.org, Athletes Biography, http://www.iaaf.orglathletes/athlete=62739/index.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
97. Id.
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Olympic athletes like Marion Jones to a higher standard, society runs
the risk of altering and harming competition by making it unsafe and
unfair. Ultimately, the best solution is for the courts to utilize a pro-
fessional negligence or malpractice standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Marion Jones has not only destroyed her own integ-
rity as a result of ingesting "the Clear," but she has also caused her
eight innocent relay teammates, Jearl Miles-Clark, LaTasha Col-
lander-Richardson, Monique Hennagan and Andrea Anderson,
Chryste Gaines, Torri Edwards, Nanceen Perry and Passion Richard-
son to lose Olympic medals, records, endorsements, and respect.98
These eight athletes had no choice in the matter, they were unaware
of Jones's poor judgment in violating the doping rules and suffered as
a result of those violations. Consequently, Jones must be held liable
for her actions based on a professional negligence or malpractice stan-
dard. Holding Jones to a reckless disregard standard does not further
the policy reasons for enacting anti-doping rules and does not protect
safe, natural, and vigorous competition. Jones's eight relay teammates
were victims of Jones's professional malpractice and deserve redress.
Ultimately, Jones is guilty of professional malpractice because she vio-
lated a duty to her eight relay mates, caused them injury, and she must
be held responsible.
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